Eve Ramaekers

 

CORE

University of Louvain
Voie du Roman Pays 34, L1.03.01

1348 Louvain-la-Neuve

Belgium

Tel: + 32 10 474356

Fax: + 32 10 474301
Email: eve.ramaekers [at] uclouvain.be

EDUCATION

2006    Ph.D. in Economics, University of Namur, Belgium

2003    M.A. in Economics, University of Louvain & University of Namur, Belgium


N.B.

[2005 - 2006]    United States, University of Rochester NY, Visiting Ph.D. student

[2000]               Spain, Universidad de Zaragoza, European exchange program

[1998 - 1999]    The Netherlands, Rotterdam Erasmus Universiteit, European exchange program

[1995 - 1996]    Austria, Kirchdorf a.d. Krems Bundesrealgymnasium, Rotary exchange program

[1991 - 1992]    United States, Albany CA High School, Ninth grade



RESEARCH INTERESTS

Microeconomics, Social Choice Theory, Game Theory, Mechanism Design



PAPERS & WORKS IN PROGRESS

  1. •Characterizations of Pareto-efficient, fair, and strategy-proof allocation rules in queueing problems, with C. Kayi, Games and Economic Behavior 68 (2010): 220-232

  2. •Fair allocation of indivisible goods: The two-agent case, forthcoming in Social Choice and Welfare

  3. •An impossibility in sequencing problems, with C. Kayi, METEOR research memoranda 040, Maastricht University, Maastricht

  4. •Implementation in undominated strategies by bounded and covered mechanisms, with S. Mukherjee and A. Sen

  5. •The Shapley value for the fair allocation of an indivisible good, with G. Valletta

  6. •Stability, monotonicity, and consistency in matching with contracts when agents negotiate


 


MORE INFO

CV downloadable here

 

                                                                                                                                        DATE: Spring 2012

ERC research fellow, advanced grant project Poverty, resource equality, and social policies

                      CORE (Center for Operations Research and Econometrics)