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**ON CONSERVATIVE STABLE STANDARD OF BEHAVIOUR
IN SITUATIONS WITH PERFECT FORESIGHT**

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Abstract

In this note we show that the solution notion called *conservative stable standard of behaviour* (CSSB), introduced by Greenberg (1990) has very little predictive power in environments with farsighted players although intuitively it is quite nice. First we show that CSSB can make no prediction at all in a large class of environments that are commonly encountered (like normal form games, social networks etc.), i.e., the entire set of social states is stable with respect to this notion. Next we find that even with some feasibility restrictions on the paths, the set of outcomes stable with respect to CSSB is a superset (some times a strict superset) of the largest consistent set (LCS) in a class of environments that includes voting games with a finite number of outcomes, even though for such environments the LCS itself may contain many intuitively unreasonable outcomes.

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