

CORE DISCUSSION PAPER
2002/01

Two remarks on the inner core

Geoffroy de Clippel¹ and Enrico Minelli²

December 2001

Abstract

For the case of smooth concave exchange economies, we provide a characterization of the inner core as the set of feasible allocations such that no coalition can improve on it, even if coalitions are allowed to use some random plans. For the case of compactly generated games, we discuss Myerson's definition of the inner core, and we characterize it using lexicographic utility weight systems.

JEL Classification: C71, D50.

¹Aspirant FNRS; CORE, Université catholique de Louvain, Belgium; e-mail: declippel@core.ucl.ac.be.

²Chercheur qualifié FNRS; CORE, Université catholique de Louvain, Belgium; e-mail: minelli@core.ucl.ac.be.

We wish to thank Martin Meier for useful comments.

This paper presents research results of the programme "Actions de recherche concertées" of the Communauté française de Belgique. The scientific responsibility is assumed by the authors.