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**SINCERE AND STRATEGIC VOTERS IN A MODEL OF
PROPORTIONAL REPRESENTATION**

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Abstract

In this paper we analyze a model of proportional representation that allows for both sincere and strategic voting. We prove that strategic voters vote only for the extreme parties in any equilibrium, if the electorate is large. Moreover, we show that there is an effect of sincere voters' behavior on the equilibrium outcome, for which strategic voters cannot fully adjust.

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