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STRATEGIC MULTILATERAL EXCHANGE AND TAXES

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Abstract

This contribution investigates the effectiveness and welfare implications of fiscal policies in a context of multilateral trade, when traders behave strategically. The present approach deals simultaneously with two aspects of fiscal policies: collecting resources for redistributive purposes and correcting distortions related to imperfectly competitive behaviour.

Keywords: imperfect competition, taxation, strategic market game.

JEL Classification: H30, L13, C72, D51.

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